NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 41 | Number 1

Article 14

12-1-1962

Criminal Law -- Procedure -- Indictments -Principal Includes Accessory Before the Fact as
Lesser Offense
William R. Hoke

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
William R. Hoke, Criminal Law -- Procedure -- Indictments -- Principal Includes Accessory Before the Fact as Lesser Offense, 41 N.C. L. Rev.
118 (1962).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol41/iss1/14

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The court in the principal case found the printed clauses in the
acknowledgment to be the controlling expression of defendant's intent. By doing so, however, it ignores comment two of section 2-207
which prohibits such a finding when there is an agreement in existence between the parties at the time the acknowledgment is dispatched, unless the acknowledgment states that its expression of
acceptance will not be effective until assent is given to the additional
7
or different terms.1

At the end of 1960, the Uniform Commercial Code had been
adopted in only six states ;28 since then, it has been enacted in twelve
more.2 9 Consequently, litigation concerning the interpretation of
the Code is bound to increase. However, until considerable litigation
has ensued, the only mutually applicable authority courts will have
in interpreting it will be the comments which the drafters have appended to the various sections. Unless courts explain their decisions
in terms of these comments, the uniformity of the law of commercial
transactions which the Code contemplates8 0 will not be realized.
WILLIAM EMMETT UNDERWOOD, JR.

Criminal Law-Procedure--Indictments--Principal
sory Before the Fact as Lesser Offense

Includes Acces-

The common law defines a principal in crime as a person who
actually participates in the commission of a felony.' A principal in
the first degree commits the crime either by his own hand or by the
hand of his agent, and such principal must be actually or constructively present at the act. A principal in the second degree is present,
actually or constructively, and aids or abets in the commission of
The result reached by the court may have been contemplated by comment 2, but this is impossible to determine since the court did not consider
the possibility that the relationship of the parties and their prior dealings indicated that an agreement may have been reached at the time the acknowledgment was dispatched.
28 Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island.
" Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wyoming.
"0Section 1-102(2) provides: "Underlying purposes and policies of this
Act are (a), to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties; (c) to make uniform the
law among the various jurisdictions."
1 There are no accessories to treason and misdemeanors at common law.
I WHARTON, CmImIxAL LAW AND PRocEDuRE § 102 (1957).
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the crime but does not himself perpetrate it. An accessory before
the fact procures, counsels or commands another to commit a felony
but is not present, actually or constructively, at its commission.2
A sharp split of opinion concerning the law of principals and
accessories divided the North Carolina Supreme Court in a recent
decision, and this division reflects a general split of authority among
other jurisdictions. In State v. Jones,' the court, by a four to three
majority, held that accessory before the fact is a lesser included
offense in an indictment for murder. It seems worthwhile to
examine the background of this decision and to ponder its ramifications.
The applicable North Carolina statutes,5 augmenting the common
law, provide that an accessory before the fact may be indicted and
convicted of a "substantive felony" -whether the principal shall or
shall not have been previously convicted, and that the punishment
for accessory before the fact of murder, arson, burglary, and rape
shall be life imprisonment.
The North Carolina court laid -the groundwork for the Jones
opinion in its decision in State v. Bryson,6 where it interpreted the
statutes as implying that the common-law distinction between principal and accessory was abolished. This would indicate that the
accused could be found guilty as a principal regardless of proof that
he was not present at the criminal act. Indeed, the court in the
Bryson case approved of this situation.7
Id. at §§ 102-10. See State v. Bass, 255 N.C. 42, 120 S.E.2d 580 (1961).
8254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961). For a brief discussion of this
case, see CriminalLaw, Ninth Annual Case Law Survey, 40 N.C.L. REv. 517

(1962).

' "Upon the trial of any indictment the prisoner may be convicted of the
crime charged therein or of -a less degree of the same crime, or of an attempt
to commit the crime so charged, or of an attempt to commit a less degree of
the same crime." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-170 (1953).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-5, -6 (1953).
173 N.C. 803, 92 S.E. 698 (1917).
"Upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that the accused
could not be convicted as a principal if he was not present at the murder,
the court said that it was "of opinion that the indictment and conviction of
the prisoner in this case comes within the language and intent of Revisal,
3287, and 3269 [N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-5, 15-170 (1953)], which made accessory before the fact the 'substantive felony,' and which are intended to destroy
the technical distinctions which had so often led to such miscarriages of
justice as would be caused here if the prisoner, who has been tried and

convicted upon evidence of his active participation in causing the death of
his wife by counseling, aiding and procuring his daughter to slay her, should
be discharged of all liability." State v. Bryson, id. at 806, 92 S.E. at 699.
The Bryson court, faced with a problem of statutory interpretation, ap-
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But apparently this is the only occasion when the court has expressly discounted the element of presence." Even the principal case,'
although relying on Bryson in holding that accessory is a lesser
included offense, recognized that presence distinguishes a principal
from an accessory. The accused in the Jones case was indicted and
tried for murder. The court stated that since the crime of accessory
before the fact was included in the indictment as a lesser offense, the
trial judge should have instructed the jury as to the elements of
accessory if evidence was offered tending to show that the accused
procured, counseled or commanded the murder, but was not present
at its commission. It would seem that if the distinction is abolished,
no such instruction would be necessary inasmuch as the jury could
convict as principal regardless of presence or absence.' 0
Two cases" decided prior to the Bryson case held that the distinction between accessory and principal was not abolished and, consequently, that accessory before the fact was not a lesser included
offense. It should be pointed out that the Bryson court, although
aware of the earlier decisions, was faced with a fact situation whereby the accused stood to receive a lighter sentence for second degree
murder than he could have received as an accessory before the fact
of first degree murder. The court reasoned that since the sentence
imposed (20 years imprisonment) was less than that to which he
parently concluded that "substantive felony" meant the offense of the principal. Contra, the Maine court's interpretation of a similar statute: "[T]he
offense for which an accessory before the fact may be indicted and convicted
is a substantive felony, a form of expression, which is general, and not meant
to refer to either [principal or accessory] .

. .

. A substantive felony is

that which depends upon itself, and is not dependent upon another felony,
which is established by the conviction of the one, who committed it, alone."
State
v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84 (1848).
8 But see State v. Bryson, supra note 7, at 806, 92 S.E. at 699, which
cited State v. Chastain, 104 N.C. 900, 10 S.E. 519 (1889) as holding that
the element of presence is not a prerequisite for a conviction as a principal.
In the latter case the accused, armed with a rifle and concealed 150 yards
behind his brother, who was lying in wait for the victim, was indicted and
convicted as a principal. It seems, however, that the accused was constructively present and indictable, consequently, as a principal in the second degree.
"A person is constructively present, and therefore guilty as a principal, if
he is acting with the person who actually commits the deed in pursuance of
a common design, and is aiding his associate, either by keeping watch or
otherwise, or is so situated as to be able to aid him, with a view, known to
the other, to insure success in the accomplishment of the common enterprise."
CLARK AND MARSHALL, LAW OF CRImEs § 167 (5th ed. 1952).
State v. Jones, 254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961).
10 Cf.,

jury instruction in State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 92 S.E. 698

(1917).
" State v. Green, 119 N.C. 899, 26 S.E. 112 (1896); State v. Dewer, 65
N.C. 572 (1871).
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was liable if he had been tried and convicted as an accessory before
the fact (life imprisonment), the accused could not complain that
he was not convicted as an accessory. In reaching this result the
court apparently left the door open for future misunderstandings.
While the strict, narrow holding of the Bryson case was that the
accused could be convicted of second degree murder under an indictment for murder, whether or not he was present at the crime, the
court three years later interpreted this to mean that accessory before
the fact is a lesser included offense in an indictment for the principal's crime.' 2
This problem has arisen in North Carolina and elsewhere as a
result of the enactment of statutes that have altered the common-law
concepts of accessory and principal. Some jurisdictions have adopted
statutes 3 which provide that the distinction between accessory before
the fact and principal is abolished, while others have enacted statutes 4
which do not expressly abolish the distinction but at the same time
provide the same punishment for both offenders. The North CaroWe have
lina statutes would appear to occupy a third category.'
seen that under their provisions the punishments for a principal and
for an accessory before the fact are not necessarily identical. The
matter of the abolition of the distinction in North Carolina is less
clear.
Other jurisdictions have held'" that statutes providing for the
prosecution of accessories before the fact jointly with the principal,
and for their trial regardless of whether or not the principal is tried,
do not abolish the common-law distinction between accessory and
principal. It has also been held' that the distinction is not abolished
by statutes making one who aids, abets or procures another to commit a felony, guilty of a substantive crime. Despite a statute providing that their punishments are identical, it has been held'" that
" State v. Simons, 179 N.C. 700, 103 S.E. 5 (1920) (dictum).
"See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1950); CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (1955); FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 776.011 (Supp. 1961); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 2 (Supp. 1962);
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.01.030 (1961).
1' See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-

602, -603 (1953); MASs. LAWS ANN. ch. 274, § 2 (1956); S.C. CODE § 16-1
(1952); W. VA. CODE § 6118 (1955).
" But see State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 806, 92 S.E. 698, 699 (1917),
where the court seemed to consider North Carolina's statutes as among those
abolishing the distinction.
"' Able v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. 698 (1869); State v. Ricker, 29 Me.
84 (1848); State v. Roberts, 50 W. Va. 422, 40 S.E. 484 (1901).
'v State v. Ricker, supra note 16.
State v. Ricker, 29 Me. 84

Able v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. 698 (1869);
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thedistinction between principal and accessory prevails. Conversely,
it has been held 9 that a statute providing that accessories shall be
punished in the same manner as the principal in effect makes principals of accessories before the fact.
The primary problem born of this controversy is that of the
proper manner of drawing the indictment. The common-law rule
is that an accessory before the fact in a felony case must be indicted
as such and not as a principal.2" But by virtue of statutes 2' in some
jurisdictions it has been held 22 that an accessory before the fact may
be indicted as though he were the principal without setting out the
facts by which he advised, counseled, or procured another to commit
the crime. In some instances the statutes 23 expressly provide that
an accessory before the fact may or shall be indicted as a principal.
But even in the absence of such a provision, where the distinctions
between principals and accessories before the fact have been abolished,
the indictment has been held24 to have been properly drawn against
a principal. By following the opinions in State v. Simo= 25 and
State v. Jones, 26 it is now permissible in North Carolina to draw an
indictment against the accused as a principal and convict him thereunder as an accessory before the fact.
(1848); State v. Lacoshus, 96 N.H. 76, 70 A.2d 203 (1950); State v. Pa-

triarca, 71, R.I. 151, 43 A.2d 54 (1945); State v. Jennings, 158 S.C. 422,
155 S.E. 621 (1930); Pierce v. State, 130 Tenn. 24, 168 S.W. 851 (1914).
State v. Patriarca, supra, raises an interesting point concerning limitation
of actions. It holds that where a felony and being an accessory before
the fact to a felony are regarded as distinct offenses, a statute excepting murder from a limitation of the time for instituting criminal prosecution
cannot be regarded as also excepting a prosecution on the charge of being an
accessory before the fact to the crime of murder, even though the statute
provides that the accessory shall suffer the same punishment as the principal.
People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229, 21 Am. Dec. 122 (N.Y. 1830) is sometimes
cited as opposing the Rhode Island case, but its opinion on this point is
dictum.
Buie v. State, 68 Fla. 320, 67 So. 102 (1914). Subsequent to this decision the Florida statute was rewritten, abolishing the distinction. See note
13 supra.
2042 C.J.S. Indictments and Inzformzations § 148 (1944).
"='E.g.,COLO. Rv.STAT. § 40-1-12 (1953); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §28.979

(1954); WAs.

REv. CODE ANN. § 9.01.030 (1961).
Newton v. People, 96 Colo. 246, 41 P.2d 300 (1935); People v. Knoll,
258 Mich. 89, 242 N.W. 222 (1932) ; State v., Cooper, 26 Wash. 2d 405, 174
22

P.2d2 545 (1946).
E.g., IOWA CODE § 688.1 (1950); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 28.979 (1954);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4 (1958) ; VA. CODE § 18.1-11 (1950) ; WAsu. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.01.030 (1961).
People v. Bliven, 112 N.Y. 79, 19 N.E. 638 (1889).
22179

N.C. 700, 103 S.E. 5 (1920).

28254

N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (1961).
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A question still to be adjudicated, in the-light of the North Carolina cases herein discussed, is the interesting one 'of former jeopardy.
It was the common-law rules that prosecution as a principal did not
forbid a subsequent prosecution as.an accessory. Where.it is considered that principal and accessory are distinct offenses and not
different degrees of the same crime, the general rule is that an
acquittal of one indicted as a principal is not a bar to a subsequent
indictment against him as an accessory; and, conversely, an acquittal
as an accessory is no bar to an indictment as a principal. On the
other hand, jeopardy does. attach when accessories may be indicted
as principals.17 However, the North Carolina court has indicated
that it is at least sympathetic with the idea that jeopardy should
attach, under the proper circumstances, when the offenses are sepa8
rate and distinct.
Where the courts do rule that jeopardy attaches upon the indictment of an accessory as a principal, it seems that, speaking 'for the
accused, this rule is one salutary result of such changes'in the conmon law as have 'been disdussed in this note. Balancing this result
is the possibility that the accused -could be unduly burdened in' preparing his defense in those jurisdictions, including North Carolina,
where he may be convicted as an accessory before the fact under arf
indictment as a principal.
A reconsideration of the holding of the Bryson case, when 'the
opportunity next presents itself, may be in order. 9 If the Jones case
can be interpreted as maintaining the distinction between Principal
and accessory before the fact for purposes of the trial court's instruc2' 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 294 (1961);
Contra, People v. Mather, -4
Wend.
229,
21
Am.
Dec.
122
(NhY.
1830)
(dictum).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-5 (1953) 'provides that "no person who shall be
once duly tried for any-such, offense, whether as an accessory before the,fact
or as for a substantive felony, shall be liableto be again indicted or tried
for the same offense." The Bryson court expressed the opinion that'the
proviso "gives force to the prisoner's motion for an absolute discharge and
exemption from liability if it was error to try him for the substantive felony
of murder in counseling, procuring, or commanding his daughter to slay her
mother . . . ." State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 803, 805-06, 92 S.E, 698,/699
(1917). But because the court found no error in the trial, the question was
not adjudicated.
9 The holding of the Bryson case was not disputed in the argument of-the
principal case before the court. Note also that in its appellate brief the state
submitted that a charge of conspiracy would provide another means of arriving at a verdict of murder in the first degree. "Everyone who enters into a
common purpose or design is equally deemed in law a party to every act whicl
may afterwards be done by any one of the others, in furtherance of such
common design." State v. Jackson, 82 N.C. 565 (1880), quoted in Brief for
the State, p. 8, State v. Jones, 254 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213" (1961):-
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tions to the jury, this result still does not answer the important
questions that arise in the area of former jeopardy. Perhaps the
General Assembly may see a need to revise our law of principals and
accessories, as numerous other legislatures have done. 0 A clarification is needed to remove the state of uncertainty that now exists.
WILLIAm R. HOKE
Evidence-Presumptions and Burden of Proof-Agency-Motor Vebiles-Identifying Markings
In 1947 the North Carolina Supreme Court in Carterv. Thruston
Motor Lines Inc.,' held that proof of identifying markings on a
commercial vehicle, taken in conjunction with adequate evidence of
negligent operation of the vehicle, was not sufficient to sustain the
necessary inferences of ownership, agency, and scope of employment 2
to make out a prima facie case of respondeat superior liability against
the party suggested by the markings as being the owner. A note
writer in this Review at that time3 suggested that the difficulties of
proof frequently confronting plaintiffs in respect of ownership,
agency, and scope, as illustrated in that case, might well justify
judicial adoption of a rule by which the master-servant relationship
and scope of employment would be inferred from proof of ownership.
The court did not do so, but the legislature in 1951 enacted such a
rule in G.S. § 20-71.1,' which contained the additional element of
inferring ownership from proof of registration.
Whatever the intention of the legislature, the language of this
statute, that proof of the basic facts of ownership or agency shall "be
prima facie evidence" of the inferred essential facts invoking vicarious
liability, has proved a somewhat illusory weapon for plaintiffs. Since
it is couched in the language of prima facie evidence, and not of
presumption, and since it does not in terms shift the burden of proof
to the defendant, it has quite predictably 5 been construed to have no
"-See statutes cited notes 13 and 14 supra.
*227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E.2d 586 (1947).
2

Scope of employment will hereafter be referred to as "scope.

'Note, 25 N.C.L. REv. 491 (1947).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1 (1953).

' Interpretative difficulties are inevitable whenever a statute uses the terms

"prima facie evidence," or "presumption," without further directive as to

what if any effect is intended to be had upon pleading burden, burden of
proof, and probative force by virtue of the operation of statutory prima facie
evidence or presumptions. There is no unanimity as to (1) the distinctions,
if any, between prima facie evidence and presumption as concepts; (2) their

